Research

Research Interests & Projects

Here, I have tried to gather my various research projects (both publications and works in progress) under broad umbrella headings, though there is of course a great deal of cross-pollination in my research between these general headings (surely something queer-theoretic about categories could be said here!). I have placed each project under the heading that I thought best fit its core idea and provided a short summary of the project.

For works in progress, I have further tried to specify whether they are in the "outlining stage" (feel free to ask about it, but I have nowhere close to a draft), the "drafting stage" (I have some form of draft but likely am not ready to circulate it), the "drafted stage" (I have a draft and you should feel free to ask for a copy!), and the "shelved for now" (not a project I'm currently thinking about). However, I don't always update things, and you should always feel free to shoot me an email about any of them! :)

The Philosophy of Applied Mathematics

I am interested in how a variety of thinkers across disciplines (but especially in philosophy) have attempted to think through the question "How is it that we use mathematics to navigate and understand the world?" I am interested in the different ways this question has been interpreted (Who is "we"? What counts as "mathematics"? Who is this question for and why does it matter? Is it a general question or case-specific?), as well as the different criteria for a satisfactory answer to such a question (Are we looking for justification? Is this a metaphysical question? Epistemological? Pragmatic? A mixture? To what degree should analysis of mathematical practice matter in answering these questions?).

Over my years in grad school, I've thought about the question through cases like the Navier-Stokes equations and attempts to mathematize/measure inbreeding in population genetics, as well as cases in applying mathematics to mathematics like topological combinatorics. I've also tried to use the question as an opportunity to question the physical/mathematical distinction implicit in much writing about applied mathematics. In my dissertation, I am articulating a new approach to approaching this question, and to approaching applied mathematics in general, that I call "description-fitting." In this approach, I focus on the epistemic moves made by practitioners in bringing a problem and the mathematics to be applied into alignment with one another in ways constrained by their aims.

Publications

(under review, w/ Philip Sink) Description-Fitting & Alan Turing
In this paper, my coauthor Philip Sink and I attempt to do two things. The first is to introduce description-fitting as a novel approach for analyzing applied mathematics, setting out a methodology for understanding a case of applying mathematics by analyzing choices made in the description of both the informal, target phenomenon and the mathematics which will effectively model it, paying heed to the constitutive role of practitioners' goals in shaping these descriptions. Secondly, we apply this idea to analyze Alan Turing's work on his theory of computation, in particular his work in "On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem" (1936). We show how Turing deliberately tailors his descriptions of the informal human computer in order to make the connection to his desired formalism, "arbitrary production machines," more salient as well as how his descriptions are shaped by his focus on giving an account of "computable numbers" and giving a negative answer to the Entscheidungsproblem. We propose that it is the very process of carefully fitting the description of computability which makes Turing's definition so compelling, and as such accounts for its long-standing success.

Works in Progress

(drafted stage) Description-Fitting & The Practice of Applying Mathematics: How Studying Math Applied to Math Can Help Illuminate the Applicability Debates
FIX In this paper, my main argument is that the philosophy of applied mathematics literature has thus far largely ignored cases of mathematics applied to other pieces of mathematics (which would likely be counted as "pure mathematics"), and that turning our attention to such cases could in fact vastly improve our ability to analyze cases of math applied to the world. In doing so, I claim that in many instances of application, practitioners engage in a practice I call "description-fitting," the practice of bringing the problem to be solved into alignment with the mathematics to be applied, usually through successive redescription. I claim that a framework focusing on this practice not only offers a finer-grained analysis of the process of applying math in a particular case, but also allows for a more satisfactory answer to the question "How is it that we use X piece of mathematics to solve Y problem?" I make the case through demonstration of using this framework to analyze how mathematicians Noga Alon and Douglas West used the Borsuk-Ulam Theorem to solve the Necklace-Splitting Problem (see a cool video on this proof here). This then sets up my dissertation as fleshing out this framework and making stronger arguments for its fruitfulness in philosophical discussions of applied mathematics.
(drafting stage) Navier Wants It That Way: Fitting Descriptions, Coordinating Reasoning, & Wrangling Fluids
Drawing on my second dissertation chapter, I present an analysis of Claude-Louis Navier's 1821/27 derivation of the Navier-Stokes equations where Navier implements several redescriptions of fluid flow, coordinating between several systems of reasoning in order to arrive at his goal of adequately describing the macroscale effects of molecular behavior in fluid flow. On the basis of this analysis, I argue for ``description-fitting'' analysis as a prerequisite for philosophizing about applying mathematics, building on my earlier paper ``Description-Fitting \& The Practice of Applying Mathematics'' (hopefully under review).
(outlining stage) The Physical/Mathematical Distinction: You're Making Things Up Again, Philosophers
FIX In this paper, I'm trying to argue that, in concrete cases of applied mathematics, we should not take for granted a clean distinction between the mathematical and the physical. I argue that this is especially important when it comes to critiquing the state of the debate on "genuinely mathematical explanations" but also has a more general bearing on how we think about applied mathematics' relation to the world. Currently, I'm trying to make the argument with a two-prong strategy: first, using deconstructive strategies from queer theory to emphasize the definitional incoherency/instability of the physical/mathematical distinction; second, arguing that, often, what we think of as "physical concepts" and "mathematical concepts" actually mutually constitute one another in applications of mathematics.

Queer Theory, Categorization, and Critiquing Science

My interests in queer theory have arisen in a variety of contexts. First and foremost, however, from my own identity as a queer person and a desire to explore that space and its history. But through such explorations, I have also developed a strong interest in engaging with queer theory discussions of categorization/classification schemes (How can we analyze the ways we enforce categorization schemes at the expense of the world and peoples' lives? To what degree and when does the historicity of concept matter? How do we began to untangle the entangled matrices of oppositional concepts woven together over time?), how we can draw on queer and other minority experiences to explode our notions of time and hope (What might a concept of "queer time" look like? How is time mobilized in activist and anti-activist discourses? How do we think through hoping as an activist activity?), and critiquing scientific work concerning sex, gender, and sexuality (How are dominant norms encoded in such research? How should we go about addressing the scientific community as queer activists?).

I've struggled quite a bit in my journey with queer theory, from the initial googling to find "Intro to Queer Theory" syllabi to just get some basic readings/maps of the landscape, to trying to form small reading groups to talk through difficult texts, to expanding my notions of what queer thoery is or could be and abandoning (to some extent) the idea of a "canon" in queer theory and "foundational texts" (though I will always recognize certain texts as trailblazers in the process of academic recognition, we are much in their debt). But now, I'm enjoying exploring new readings, from Leo Bersani's "Sociability and Cruising" to José Esteban Muñoz's Cruising Utopia. And I'm hoping to write soon about what philosophy can learn methodologically from queer theory, as well as a more personal essays!

Works in Progress

(drafting stage) Cruising the Chasm Between Math and World: Or, How Queer Theory Can Help Us In How We Discuss Applied Mathematics in Philosophy
In this paper, I draw on work broadly falling under the umbrella "queer theory" in order to argue against a common move (implicit or explicit) in the philosophy of applied math whereby discussions start with a positioning of "math" as drastically different from/even opposed to "world." I argue that not only is this a frequent move, but that further it often involves nesting the math/world binary in a matrix of other entrenched binary oppositions (like abstract/concrete, necessary/contingent, fictional/real, etc). I specifically draw on queer theory work discussing such classification schemes with binary oppositions, as well as historiographical points, in order to analyze and draw lessons from discussions around the "unreasonable effectiveness" of mathematics in the sciences originating from Wigner's classic 1960 paper. As such, this paper is an attempt at a therapeutic intervention showing one way in which queer theory can teach philosophy methodological lessons about handling messy concepts and classification schemes.
(outlining stage) A Globalectical Reconsideration of "Science": Repositioning the Science Question in a Global(ectics) Context
I argue for a reorientation in how we pose the ``demarcation/science question.'' In particular, through consideration of traditional knowledge practices in Africa and debates around their legitimation in the context of post-/neocolonialism, I argue that we must take a pluralistic approach to the attribution of the label ``science'' to given practices, perhaps even abandoning this attribution in the realm of development projects.
(shelved for now) Blurred Temporality: The Synchronic, The Diachronic, and the Chronically Oppressed
My goal in this very-much-work-in-progress is to argue that "synchronic" and "diachronic" should be viewed as lenses through which we try to analyze the temporal mess that is our lived experience. I want to question the utility of the terms "past," "present," and "future," specifically when it comes to activism against systems of oppression. While I want to suggest that this crisscrossing of temporal lines and bounding edges occurs throughout life, I am going to argue for activism as a case in which such entanglement is especially visible, especially necessary, and especially thought. In this paper, I really want to borrow from writings about queer temporarily, as well as drawing on science fiction, notably Octavia Butler's, to talk about this blurring of temporality. I'm honestly not yet sure if this will be an ~academic piece~ or a more run-of-the-mill piece I submit elsewhere.

Philosophy Pedagogy

I have more recently begun to reflect more critically on philosophy pedagogy and how we go about teaching philospohy to udnergraduate students. I try to reflect on questions of aim (Why do we teach philosophy? What values do we think students find in such classes? What values do students themselves find in such classes? How do the values differ by context, and when do they conflict? How do the ways we design classes reflect these values?) as well as practical questions of method (What kinds of readings and assignments should we be assigning? How does it differ based on class context? What does the classroom community look like?).

As a graduate student, I have of course had limited teaching experience. As of Fall 2026, I have been a TA leading discussion sections for four semesters and taught my own course once. But I have also sought out (and been suggested) many resources on teaching which I have found incredibly valuable, from the writings of bell hooks and David Gooblar to issues of Teaching Philosophy and AAPT Studies in Pedagogy. And I have tried to innovate, especially in the class I taught Spring 2024, with how I approach teaching. I have focused on "dialogic critical thinking," the skill of critically thinking through multiple viewpoints in conversation with one another, as the core of what I want to teach. I have focused on building a "learning community" in the classroom. And I have focused much more on dialogue and messy exploration of conceptual space in class, especially in the context of intro classes that will likely be students' first and only philosophy class.

Publications

(forthcoming) "Imaginations of Their Own: Taking Play (Un)Seriously in the Undergraduate Philosophy Classroom", AAPT Studies in Pedagogy, Volume 11: Are we having fun yet? Joy and Playfulness in Teaching & Learning Philosophy
When I teach philosophy, my work is to help students find the tools and opportunities to explore and expand their imaginations. This guides how I design not only the reading list, but, more importantly, the class structure, the particular assignments, and the kinds of activities I do in class. In this essay, after reflecting on imagination and play as integral to liberatory pedagogy and dialogic critical thinking, I wander through how I ran my Spring 2024 class, the first class I taught on my own. I reflect on how my students and I drew things out, laughed together, performed for one another, and above all imagined together. I make the case for taking play and imagination seriously in the philosophy classroom, as a way to welcome more students into philosophical thinking.

Works in Progress

(drafting stage) Paulin Hountondji & The Social Good of Philosophy Education: Re-engineering the Philosophy Curriculum
I argue for philosophy education's potential to provide a social good in the role it can play in the construction of public forums concerning ``progress,'' paralleling Beninese philosopher Paulin Houtondji's ``What can philosophy do?'' I sketch how philosophy curricula must be restructured to adequately provide this social good, subject matter as well as assignment and evaluation structures.

Margaret Cavendish & Structural Barriers in the Academy

Margaret Cavendish is perhaps one of my favorite philosophers. Not only because of her immense body of work, not only because of the wide array of topics she wrote on and genres she wrote in, but primarily due to the story of her life trying to be a part of the early modern intellectual world. Especially alongside the stories of other early modern women engaging in philosophy (Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, Anne Conway, Damaris Cudworth Masham, Emilie du Châtelet, Anna Maria van Schurman, etc), her story in particularly stark detail lays out the many barriers to women entering early modern philosophy, from the standards of formal education to the insufficiency of networking in certain cases. And further, her story highlights strategies of resistance from being barred from the academy, including her exploration of genre and the many rhetorical moves made in her prefaces.

My interest in Cavendish, then, has pushed me to reflect on the current institution of academic philosophy, both the barriers to including the many underrepresented groups (To what degree must we look all the way back to primary and secondary education as sites of exclusion? How does the image of philosophy in the popular imagination discourage people from underrepresented backgrounds from entering philosophy? How do we as activists for inclusion reckon with the hostility of others in the field?) and the possible strategies of resistance (How can we expand the boundaries of what counts as "acceptable philosophy" in the field? How do we explode the canon? How do we reckon with resisting while working within the dominant institutional framework and culture?). I try and integrate some of these reflections into my teaching, from expanding the range of work I teach (activist writings, sociology, essays, fiction, plays) to expanding the range of work students can use to express themselves. And although many of these thoughts are still baking, hopefully through more conversation with others I can begin to write them out!

Works in Progress

(shelved for now) Margaret Cavendish: Disrupting the Dominant Discourse (Then And Now)
In this paper, I'm advocating a specific approach to historiography of marginalized philosophers that has as its aim addressing structural injustices in contemporary academia. As far as fleshing out this method, I try to make some useful comparisons to Pamela VanHaitsma's notion of gossip as queer historiographical method and Critical Race Theory's perspective on historical narrative construction. I then try to apply this sort of method in a preliminary way to Margaret Cavendish's life and struggles to gain acclaim in early modern philosophy. I particularly analyze how she transgressed gender norms for education and genre norms of publication and suggest what we migth bring forward as lessons for how we structure academic philosophy today. (slides from IMCS 2022 conference presentation available on request)

Miscellaneous Fun Box to Catch Everything Else!!

Here, I will gather some hot 'n spicy keywords that have popped up across my studies but have not yet congealed into clear directions for research (there are many): pragmatism (especially Rorty and Hacking), phenomenology, historiographical methods, critical philosophy, postmodernism (gettin' into Lyotard!), poststructuralism, deconstruction (Derrida time!), conceptual genealogies etc....

Presentations

(upcoming) Applying Mathematics By Fitting Descriptions: A New Approach to Applied Mathematics
30th Philosophy of Science Association Biennial Meeting (2026, accepted poster)
Applying Mathematics By Fitting Descriptions: The Case of Borsuk-Ulam and the Necklace-Splitting Problem
Canadian Society for the History and Philosophy of Mathematics (2026)
Description Fitting and Alan Turing
25th Annual Pitt-CMU Graduate Conference (2026, accepted talk w/ Philip Sink)
Description Fitting and Alan Turing
Pittsburgh Formal Epistemology Workshop (Fall 2025, invited talk w/ Philip Sink)
The Physical/Mathematical Distinction: You're Making Things Up Again Philosophers!
28th Philosophy of Science Association Biennial Meeting (2022, accepted poster)
Margaret Cavendish: Disrupting the Dominant Discourse (Then and Now)
13th International Margaret Cavendish Society Conference (2022, accepted talk)
Physical Magnitudes and Physical Concepts: The Correspondence Critique of the Mapping Account of Applied Mathematics
8th Biennial Society for the Philosophy of Science in Practice Conference (2020, accepted talk; conference canceled due to Covid)
Physical Magnitudes and Physical Concepts: The Correspondence Critique of the Mapping Account of Applied Mathematics
27th Philosophy of Science Association Biennial Meeting (2020/2021, accepted poster)

Unpublished/Undergraduate Manuscripts

(Undergraduate Thesis) "What Is 'Applied Mathematics' Anyway? How the History of Fluid Mechanics Demonstrates the Role of Concepts in Applied Mathematics" pdf here

"A Step Toward the Elucidation of Quantitative Laws of Nature" Stance, An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal (Spring 2020) here

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